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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3078 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DORIAN D. STEPHENS, a/k/a DEE, 
 
               Appellant        
 
                                                         
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. No. 3-10-cr-00001-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
                                                             
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on July 12, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, HARDIMAN and ROTH, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: October 16, 2012) 
 
                         
 
O P I N I O N 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge
 Dorian D. Stephens appeals the judgment of sentence related to his convictions for 
distribution and possession of crack cocaine.  Stephens entered a plea agreement in which 
: 
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he waived his right to appeal. We find that this waiver should be enforced here.  We will 
accordingly dismiss this appeal. 
I.  
 In transactions occurring in November 2008 and October 2009, Stephens sold a 
combined total of seventeen grams of crack cocaine to confidential informants working 
with federal law enforcement officers.  In connection with these drug deals, he was 
ultimately indicted on one count of distribution of five or more grams of crack cocaine 
and a second count of possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of crack 
cocaine.  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).  After his arrest, law enforcement 
authorities obtained a warrant to search his home, and based on their discovery of two 
handguns there, he was indicted on a third charge – unlawful possession of a firearm by a 
felon.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). 
BACKGROUND 
 On January 31, 2011, Stephens entered a plea agreement pursuant to which he 
would plead guilty to the two drug crimes and the government would drop the felon in 
possession of a firearm charge.  He also agreed to waive his right to appeal his sentence 
subject to the following exceptions:  (1) if the government appealed his sentence, (2) if 
the sentence exceeded the applicable statutory limits, or (3) if his sentence unreasonably 
exceeded the range determined to be applicable by the District Court under the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines.   
Stephens’ sentencing took place in July 2011.  His Presentence Report calculated 
the Guidelines range for his sentence as 188-235 months imprisonment.  Stephens 
discussed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) in his Sentencing Memorandum 
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and asked that it be applied to him.  He did not attempt, however, to make the 
application, or not, of the FSA to his sentence a grounds for appeal.  Stephens also 
moved for a downward variance so that he would receive a sentence no greater 
than 60 months.  While the Court did not grant this request, it did find that a 
departure from the Guidelines range to a reduced range of 60-120 months was 
appropriate.  It ultimately sentenced Stephens to 72 months imprisonment for each 
of the drug crimes, to be served concurrently.  Stephens appeals that sentence. 
II.  
 Stephens’ central argument on appeal is that the District Court erred in imposing 
his sentence by failing to apply the FSA, which operated to reduce sentences for certain 
crack cocaine-related offenses. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 
124 Stat. 2372 (2010).  He contends, on the basis of this Court’s opinion in United States 
v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2011), which was issued subsequent to his sentencing, 
that the District Court was required to apply the FSA in determining his sentence.  In 
Dixon, we held that the more lenient penalties of the FSA applied retroactively to 
defendants such as Stephens who were sentenced after that statute’s enactment, 
regardless of when they committed their underlying offenses.
DISCUSSION 
1
                                                          
1 This holding has been confirmed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Dorsey v. United 
States, 567 U.S. ----, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012). 
  Stephens claims that, had 
the FSA been applied in his case, as Dixon requires, his Guidelines range would have 
been computed as only 151-188 months.  Of course, the revised range of 60-120 months 
that the Court employed in sentencing him was wholly below this range.  Stephens 
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argues, however, that the revised range on which the Court settled might have been even 
lower had it been operating from the assumption of the lower initial Guidelines range. 
 We have jurisdiction to review Stephens’s sentence based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  However, we will not exercise this jurisdiction if we conclude 
that Stephens knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence and that 
the enforcement of that waiver would not work a miscarriage of justice.  United States v. 
Gwinnet, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).  As we noted earlier, Stephens waived his 
right to appeal his sentence in his plea agreement, subject to three exceptions that are 
inapplicable here.  Also, he does not argue in his appellate briefs, and, indeed, concedes 
in a letter to the Court dated June 28, 2012, written pursuant to Rule 28(j) of the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, that this waiver was knowing and voluntary.   
The only basis to consider Stephens’ appeal, then, would be if enforcing his 
appellate waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.  This would be the case if doing so 
would “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 929 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  “This exception will be applied sparingly and without 
undue generosity.”  United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Its application is not warranted here. 
Stephens largely argues that his appeal should be heard because sentencing him 
without reference to the FSA constituted legal error.  A waiver of appellate rights, 
however, necessarily includes the forbearance of appealing even blatant errors.  See 
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001).  Stephens nevertheless insists 
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that it would be unjust for the Court not to exercise jurisdiction over his appeal because 
the government has chosen not to enforce appellate waivers agreed to by certain other 
criminal defendants who were sentenced after the FSA’s passage but not afforded the 
benefits of that statute’s penalty reductions.  As we have previously observed, however, 
the government “may always choose not to invoke an appellate waiver” as a matter of 
discretion.  United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 535 (3d Cir. 2008).  In relation to a 
defendant who files an appeal in order to obtain the benefit of the application of the FSA, 
it is possible that the government would decide whether or not to enforce a waiver based 
on the facts of the underlying crime, the sentence already imposed, the potential impact 
of resentencing, and other mitigating and exacerbating factors.  The fact that the 
government has exercised its discretion in favor of certain defendants does not compel it 
to do so for all and does not render its decision to enforce Stephens’ waiver a miscarriage 
of justice. 
Finally, Stephens argues that enforcement of his appellate waiver would work a 
miscarriage of justice because the waiver was the result of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  We generally defer resolution of stand-alone claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel to collateral proceedings rather than address them on direct appeal.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir. 1989).  We will so defer here.   
III. 
 For the reasons explained above, we will dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.   
CONCLUSION 
